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Background: In functional movement disorders, explicit movements are impaired, while
implicit movements are preserved. Furthermore, there is evidence that the sense of
agency is abnormal.
Aim: We aimed to investigate how motor responses and sense of agency were affected
by subliminal or supraliminal cues in people with functional movement disorders.
Methods: Twenty-three people with a functional movement disorder and 26 healthy
controls took part in a subliminal and supraliminal priming experiment which investigated
reaction times, choice and sense of agency. Participants pressed a left or right arrow
key in response to an imperative left or right pointing arrow. Either key could be
pressed in response to bidirectional arrows. The imperative arrow was preceded by
a small left or right pointing prime arrow, that was non-predictive (50% correct) and
was presented in either subliminal or supraliminal conditions. The participant’s response
caused the appearance of a colored circle and they rated the degree of control they
felt over its appearance (sense of agency). The circle’s color depended on whether their
response was congruent or incongruent with the prime arrow direction. After exclusion,
19 participants remained in each group.
Results: Prime-compatible responses led to faster reaction times in both the subliminal
and supraliminal condition. Subliminal prime-compatible responses were chosen more
frequently in the free choice condition. The sense of agency did not depend on
prime-response congruency. There were no significant differences in any of these
measures between the two groups.
Conclusion: With non-predictive cues, reaction times, choices, and the sense of agency
remain normal in people with functional movement disorders, for both subliminal and
supraliminal primes. The findings suggest that it is not so much conscious awareness
of the movement, but rather conscious motor preparation that is detrimental to motor
function in functional movement disorders.
Keywords: subliminal priming, supraliminal priming, agency, functional movement disorders, functional
neurological disorder, conversion disorder, motor control
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INTRODUCTION
Sense of agency refers to the sense of controlling one’s own
actions, and, through them, events in the outside world. In other
words, it is the conscious experience that one has volitional or
willed control over one’s own actions and can therefore influence
the environment (1).
There are several reasons for suspecting an abnormality of
the sense of agency in functional movement disorders (FMD).
FMD share many characteristics of voluntary movements:
they manifest with attention and improve or disappear
with distraction; voluntary movements interfere with them
as exemplified by the phenomenon of “entrainment” (2);
and some FMDs are preceded by a “Bereitschaftspotential”
on electroencephalography, which is typically present before
self-paced voluntary movements and absent in involuntary
movements (3). Patients, however, clearly state that their
abnormal movements are involuntary. Could it be that the
abnormal movements in FMD are indeed voluntary movements
in terms of the physiological pathway that generates them,
but are anomalous in terms of the conscious experience that
accompanies their generation? Indeed, previous studies, both
of intentional binding (4) and of the experience of conscious
intention (5), have indicated an abnormal sense of agency in
FMD. Abnormal activation of the temporoparietal junction in
FMD, an area commonly implicated in the sense of agency
further points in this direction (6).
It remains an open question whether the sense of agency per
se is abnormal in FMD or if it is only impaired in the context of
volitional actions.
Another interesting aspect of FMD is that motor performance
is generally normal with implicit movements, but impaired with
explicit movements. Which aspect of explicit motor control leads
to abnormal movements? We hypothesized that increasing the
attention and awareness associated with a movement would
impair motor performance and sense of agency, in an FMD
group, though not in healthy volunteers.
Subliminal priming offers a way of influencing actions or
decisions, and thus influencing the voluntary motor pathway
without the participant’s awareness of this influence. A visual
stimulus (the “prime”) is shown for a very short period, and
its processing interrupted “masked” by the presentation of
another stimulus (the “mask”) shortly after. The processing
of the prime does thereby not reach consciousness, but it is
nevertheless processed at a subliminal level thereby influencing
subsequent responses. We suggest that subliminal priming
therefore constitutes an implicit influence on the voluntary
motor pathway, while supraliminal priming would explicitly
influence the voluntary motor pathway.
Comparing the sense of agency with subliminal as opposed
to supraliminal priming gives an opportunity to investigate
whether it is the sense of agency per se that is affected in
FMD, or if it is only affected in the context of conscious
movement control. In addition, priming allows the measurement
of further aspects of motor control, namely response speed
and choice.
We therefore set out to evaluate, implicit vs. explicit motor
control in terms of sense of agency, motor performance and
action choice with the help of a subliminal and supraliminal
priming paradigm.
METHODS
Twenty-three people with FMD and 26 age and gender matched
healthy control subjects took part. Almost all patients were
recruited from the clinical practice of experts in FMD (ME
and KB), primarily as they were seen in inpatient or outpatient
settings. People with any type of FMDwere invited to participate,
with the following exclusion criteria: presence of an organic
neurological disorder (apart from headache disorders), cognitive
impairment, inability to perform the experiment, and age under
18 or over 80. Several participants had previously taken part
in a functional tremor study, which explains their relatively
large proportion. All participants’ diagnoses were confirmed
by a further neurologist (ACH) on the day of the study,
according to the diagnostic criteria described by Espay and
Lang (7). She also ensured that the healthy controls did not
have any undiagnosed movement disorder. The healthy control
subjects were patients’ family members, acquaintances, and
healthy volunteers recruited from University College London’s
registries.
Experimental Setup
The methods were adapted from earlier studies (8–10).
Participants were seated, at a viewing distance of 65 cm, in
front of a 19-inch computer screen on which the stimuli were
presented. The task (Figure 1) was to press the corresponding
left or right keyboard key as quickly as possible in response to
a left or right pointing large imperative arrow (directional arrow
“fixed choice”). In the case of a bidirectional imperative arrow
(“free choice”), subjects could choose either key, but still had to
do so as quickly as possible. They were encouraged to choose on
the spot and not to follow a fixed pattern.
Before each large imperative arrow, a small prime arrow
pointing either left or right was shown. In the subliminal
condition the prime was presented for only 16.6ms, i.e.,
subliminally and the subjects were not informed of its presence.
In the supraliminal condition, the prime arrow was shown for
200ms and participants were told to ignore it. The prime arrow
and the imperative arrow, which also represented the mask, were
isoluminant. So as to enhance the masking effect, both the prime,
and the imperative arrow appeared randomly above or below the
fixation point (8).
If the response was correct and sufficiently fast (maximum
1500ms), a colored circle appeared. Unbeknown to the
participants, the color of the circle reflected the congruence
of their response to the prime. Eight colors were randomly
allocated, so that two colors corresponded to right responses
compatible to the prime; two colors to left prime compatible
responses; two to right prime incompatible and the last two to
left prime incompatible responses. After each trial, participants
indicated how much control they felt they had over the
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FIGURE 1 | Experimental setup for subliminal and supraliminal priming with agency rating. Stimuli sizes in visual angle: prime height 0.8◦, length 1.86◦, mask height
1.09◦, length 3.26◦, circle diameter 1.86◦.
appearance of the colored circle, on a scale from 1 (absolutely no
control) to 8 (complete control).
Note that the interval between participant’s response and the
appearance of the colored circle was 100, 400, or 700ms, so as
to decrease predictability and hence lead to greater variability in
the sense of agency. If the participant’s response was too slow
(>1500ms) or incorrect in case of a directional arrow, a large “X”
appeared on the screen. Incorrect trials were repeated up to four
times at the end of the experiment, so as to avoid missing values.
All subliminal prime trials were performed separately from
all supraliminal prime trials. Which one was performed first was
assigned pseudo-randomly between participants. The participant
was informed that the color attribution changed between the two
conditions. The condition performed first contained 12 practice
trials, the condition performed second contained two.
In the subliminal condition, there were 64 prime-fixed
response compatible, 64 prime-fixed response incompatible and
64 free choice trials. Since the agency rating in the case of
supraliminal primes is most relevant in the free choice condition,
120 free choice trials were presented, and only 30 prime-fixed
response compatible and 30 prime-fixed response incompatible
trials. Each condition was performed in six blocks, allowing for
breaks in between. In the supraliminal condition, a short test at
the start confirmed that participants were able to see both the
small prime arrow and the larger imperative arrow. Stimuli were
presented and the responses recorded using Matlab R© R2015b
(Mathworks, Natick, MA, USA) in conjunction with the Cogent
2000 toolbox (www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/cogent.php).
Exclusion
Participants who saw the supposedly subliminal prime had to be
excluded. After the subliminal priming condition, participants
were informed about the presence of the prime and asked
to detect its direction in a prime visibility test. The settings
were identical to those of the subliminal priming condition,
with the exception of the absence of the colored circles and
agency ratings. Furthermore, in order to prevent responses to
the imperative arrow, participants could only respond 600ms
after the appearance of the imperative arrow, when the fixation
cross turned green. If the person reported having sometimes
seen the direction of the arrow prime, 120 trials were performed,
otherwise 90. After the prime visibility test, participants were
asked again if they had been able to see the direction of
the prime arrow. Five healthy controls and two patients who
either reported having seen the subliminal prime or who had
a high discriminability index (d’) in the prime visibility test
were excluded. Two additional participants in both groups were
excluded because they persistently gave the same agency rating.
These participants were excluded prior to data being analyzed
and replaced by new participants. The absence of a previous
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TABLE 1 | Study participant characteristics.
FMD
(n = 19)
Healthy control
(n = 19)
M:F 8:11 9:10
Age: average (SD)
(range)
46.9 y (14.1)
(20–64 y)
46.6 y (14.1)
(32–79 y)
FMD type Functional action
tremor: 14
- upper limb: 14
- lower limb: 5
- head: 2
Functional weakness: 6
- upper limb: 2
- lower limb: 5
Functional dystonia: 4
- upper limb: 1
- lower limb: 1
- cervical: 1
- mandibular: 1
Functional gait disorder: 4
Paroxysmal FMD: 5
- Hyperkinetic: 5
- Hypokinetic: 2
Functional stiffness: 2
- lower limb: 2
none: 19
Note that 12 patients had more than 1 type of FMD. All but 4 patients had an FMD of at
least one upper limb. “Functional gait disorder” means that the gait disorder comprised
a functional gait component not explained by any other listed FMD type. None of the
paroxysmal FMD was present on the day of testing.
study of this task in FMD precluded meaningful sample size
calculations. Instead, the sample sizes of 19 participants in each
group were based on the sample sizes of the two previous
subliminal priming studies on which the current one was based
[21 participants in the healthy control study (9), 16 participants
per group in the study comparing people with schizophrenia
to healthy controls (10)]. It was similar to the sample size
of 20 healthy controls in the agency study with supraliminal
priming mentioned below (11). Furthermore, the sample size
was relatively large, compared to previous reaction time studies
in FMD with supraliminal premovement cues, which included
8 (12), 11 (13), and 21 (14) FMD patients. Thus, recruitment
continued until there were 19 remaining participants in each
group. Their characteristics are detailed in Table 1.
Similar to a previous study (9), trials for which the reaction
times fell more than 1.5 times the interquartile range above the
3rd or below the 1st quartile of the participant’s responses in
that specific condition (i.e., fixed choice, or free choice within the
subliminal or supraliminal condition) were excluded as outliers
from all analyses (Table 2).
Analysis
Both the reaction time (RT) and the sense of agency data were
analyzed by means of a mixed model ANOVA with group as
the between-subject factor and prime-response congruence as
the within-subject factor. The underlying assumptions, including
sphericity, were checked and adjusted for whenever necessary.
Since ANOVA is relatively robust to departures from normality
TABLE 2 | Percentage of trials excluded as outliers in both the subliminal and
supraliminal conditions.
Subliminal Supraliminal
Fixed choice Free choice Fixed choice Free choice
HC 5.5% 4.0% 3.4% 3.8%
FMD 5.0% 4.4% 5.2% 3.0%
(15) and the sample sizes were always equal, ANOVA was
preferred, unless variances were markedly unequal. Effect size
estimates were based on partial eta squared (η2p) measures. For
the free choice trials, the t-test (or the non-parametric Wilcoxon
signed rank test) with a hypothesized mean of 50%, was used to
check if choices deviated from chance. A two-sample t-test (or
the non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum test) tested if there was
any difference in the percentage of prime-congruent free choices
between the FMD and healthy control groups. The significance
level for all tests was set at 0.05, two-tailed. Matlab R© R2015b
(Mathworks, Natick, MA, USA) and STATA R© (StataCorp. 2013.
Stata Statistical Software: Release 13. TX: StataCorp LP) were
used for data analysis.
RESULTS
Subliminal Priming
Our analyses investigated whether people with FMD perceived
a higher sense of agency and had faster reaction times
with compatible compared to incompatible primes; and when
they had a choice if they chose prime compatible responses
more frequently.
Agency
A mixed model ANOVA with group as between-subject factor
and congruence as within-subject factor, with fixed and free
choices collapsed together, indicated that the slight differences
between the congruent and incongruent agency ratings seen in
Figure 2A and Table 3 were not statistically significant (main
effect of congruence [F(1, 36) = 0.87, p = 0.36, η
2
p = 0.024], nor
was there a difference in the agency rating to prime congruent
vs. incongruent responses between the groups (interaction group
x congruence [F(1, 36) = 0.02, p = 0.90, η
2
p = 0.0005]. The main
effect of group was not significant either [F(1, 36) = 2.46, p= 0.13,
η
2
p = 0.064], and indeed would only have been a reflection of
differences in the overall use of the scale.
There is an argument to be made for perceiving a higher sense
of agency with prime compatible as opposed to incompatible
choices regardless of whether there is free choice or not. However,
one could argue that the agency rating is most intuitively relevant
in the case of free choices (bidirectional imperative arrows).
Nevertheless, including only free choice responses (Table 3), the
results were not significant for the main effect of congruence
[F(1, 36) = 0.62, p= 0.44, η
2
p = 0.017] nor for the interaction group
x congruence [F(1, 36) = 0.01, p= 0.92, η
2
p = 0.0003] either.
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FIGURE 2 | Subliminal priming agency ratings and reaction times. Average agency ratings (A) and reaction times (B) by group for prime-response incongruent vs.
congruent responses, irrespective of the type of choice (unidirectional or bidirectional imperative arrow). The agency rating ranges from 1 (absolutely no control) to 8
(complete control). The standard error of the mean is shown by the error bars.
TABLE 3 | Agency rating group averages (SD) for different prime and choice conditions.
Subliminal prime Supraliminal prime
Irrespective of choice mean Free choice trials mean Free choice trials mean Fixed choice trials mean
Incongruent Congruent Incongruent Congruent Incongruent Congruent Incongruent Congruent
HC (n = 19) 4.52 (1.32) 4.66 (1.53) 4.52 (1.25) 4.66 (1.67) 4.65 (1.47) 4.92 (1.32) 4.65 (1.29) 4.87 (1.45)
FMD (n = 19) 5.34 (1.90) 5.45 (1.74) 5.32 (1.92) 5.43 (1.81) 5.48 (1.62) 5.44 (1.47) 5.50 (1.62) 5.68 (1.42)
The table summarizes the group average agency ratings (standard deviations) according to the prime (subliminal or supraliminal prime, prime congruent, or prime incongruent responses)
and the available choice: free choice (bidirectional imperative arrow); fixed choice (unidirectional imperative arrow); irrespective of choice (either uni- or bidirectional imperative arrow).
The agency ratings range from 1 (absolutely no control) to 8 (complete control).
Reaction Time
A mixed model ANOVA with group as between-subject factor
and congruence as within-subject factor, with fixed and free
choices collapsed together, showed that the reaction times were
significantly faster with compatible compared to incompatible
primes, with a large effect size [main effect of congruence F(1, 36)
= 15.10, p = 0.0004, η2p = 0.30] (Figure 2B). There was a trend
for this effect to be more pronounced in the FMD group with
a medium to large effect size (group x congruence interaction
[F(1, 36) = 4.08, p = 0.0509, η
2
p = 0.10] (HC prime-response
incongruent: M = 585.2ms, SD = 161.4, congruent: M =
579.1ms, SD = 167.5; FMD prime-response incongruent: M =
583.9ms, SD = 154.6, congruent: M = 564.7ms, SD = 148.9)).
The main effect of group was not significant [F(1, 36) = 0.02, p =
0.88, η2p = 0.0007], indicating no significant difference in overall
reaction times between the groups.
Choice
Significantly more prime congruent responses (53.7%) were
chosen in free choice trials [Wilcoxon signed rank test with a
hypothesizedmean of 50% refuted the hypothesis that the choices
were the same as chance (Z = 2.78, p = 0.0055, r = 0.45)] and
there was no significant difference between the two groups (HC
53.1%, FMD 54.4%; two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum test Z =
–0.70, p= 0.48, r = –0.16).
Supraliminal Priming
One questions of interest is whether people with FMD perceive a
higher sense of control in free choice trials, when they choose the
opposite of what has been suggested by the supraliminal prime,
as has previously been shown in healthy controls (11).
The other relevant question is whether in fixed choice trials,
compatible supraliminal primes lead to a stronger sense of
agency and faster reaction times as opposed to incompatible
supraliminal primes.
Agency
Amixed model ANOVA of the agency ratings in free choice trials
(Table 3), with group as between-subject factor and congruence
as within-subject factor did not give a significant main effect of
congruence [F(1, 36) = 0.68, p = 0.41, η
2
p = 0.019] nor of the
interaction group x congruence [F(1, 36) = 1.30, p = 0.26, η
2
p =
0.035].
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FIGURE 3 | RT in supraliminal fixed choice trials. Average reaction times by
group for prime-response congruent vs. incongruent responses, for fixed
choice trials only (unidirectional imperative arrows). The standard error of the
mean is shown by the error bars.
Similarly, in fixed choice trials (Table 3), the main effect of
congruence was not significant, [F(1, 36) = 1.80, p = 0.19, η
2
p =
0.048] nor was the interaction group x congruence [F(1, 36) =
0.02, p= 0.88, η2p = 0.0007].
Reaction Time
A mixed model ANOVA of the reaction times with group as
between-subject factor and congruence as within-subject factor,
for the fixed choices, gave a significant main effect of congruence
with a large effect size [F(1, 36) = 9.94, p = 0.0033, η
2
p = 0.22]
but not of group [F(1, 36) = 0.17, p = 0.68, η
2
p = 0.005], nor of
the interaction group x congruence [F(1,36) = 1.71, p = 0.20, η
2
p
= 0.045] (HC prime-response incongruent: M = 674.7ms, SD
= 178.2, congruent: M = 601.1ms, SD = 133.5; FMD prime-
response incongruent:M = 630.7ms, SD = 189.1, congruent:M
= 600.2ms, SD= 188.0) (Figure 3).
There was no systematic bias with regards to the chosen
response, as there was no significant difference between the
two groups (two-sample Wilcoxon rank sum test: Z = –0.75,
p = 0.46, r = –0.17) and the chosen responses were not
significantly different from chance (Wilcoxon signed rank test
with a hypothesized mean of 50: Z = 1.62, p= 0.10, r= 0.26).
Subliminal vs. Supraliminal Priming
Taking only free choice trials into account, there was no
significant difference in agency ratings between the two groups
according to whether the prime was presented subliminally or
supraliminally [mixed model ANOVA with group as between-
subject factor and prime type and congruence as within-subject
factor, interaction effect group x prime: F(1, 36) = 0.16, p = 0.70,
η
2
p = 0.0043], nor when prime-response congruence was also
taken into account [group x prime x congruence interaction:
F(1, 36) = 0.56, p= 0.46, η
2
p = 0.015].
Similarly, the reaction times in the fixed choice trials did not
differ significantly between the two groups according to whether
the prime was subliminal or supraliminal [mixed model ANOVA
with group as between-subject factor and prime type and
congruence as within-subject factor, prime x group interaction:
F(1, 36) = 0.09, p = 0.77, η
2
p = 0.0025], nor when the prime-
response congruence was also taken into account [prime x group
x congruence interaction: F(1, 36) = 2.16, p= 0.15, η
2
p = 0.057].
Side
In the nine people with asymmetric FMD symptoms of either the
arm or the leg, the agency ratings and reaction times did not differ
significantly between the more and less affected sides [agency
ratings more affected side:M= 5.26, SD= 1.97; less affected side:
M = 4.99, SD= 2.11; paired t-test: t(8) = 1.15, p= 0.28; RT more
affected side: M = 555.0ms, SD = 145.8; less affected side: M =
559.0ms, SD= 169.7; paired t-test: t(8) = 0.348, p= 0.74].
DISCUSSION
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first subliminal
priming study in FMD and indeed in functional neurological
disorder in general. Subliminal priming was normal in terms
of overall reaction times, modulation of reaction times
with prime-congruence (faster responses with prime-congruent
responses), influence on subsequent choices (more prime-
congruent responses chosen in the free choice trials) and
perceived sense of agency. These findings provide further support
for normal implicit motor function in FMD.
A limitation of this study is the difficulty measuring how
the sense of agency varies with minor changes in premovement
priming. In this context, this study did not replicate findings
of previous studies in which healthy controls felt more control
with subliminal prime-response congruent as opposed to prime-
response incongruent responses (9, 10). Although the effect
in the present study pointed in the same direction, it did
not reach statistical significance. A larger sample size might
have led to a significant result, however, our sample size was
similar to previous studies. Similarly, the present findings did
not corroborate a previous study showing a higher sense of
agency when choosing the opposite of what was suggested by
the supraliminal prime (11). In the previous study a left or right
button needed to be pressed as quickly as possible, once a row
of crosses disappeared from the screen. The button press always
generated a tone, but subjects were told that the tone might be
generated by the computer. Subjects rated the degree they felt
they rather than the computer had generated the tone. No primes,
subliminal or supraliminal “LEFT” or “RIGHT” written primes
were randomly intermixed. Our study paradigm was clearly
different, involving fixed and free choices, different colors and
no plausible external agent. These differences might therefore
explain the non-replicability.
While people are generally aware of immediate outcomes
of their actions, measuring varying degrees of agency under
different experimental conditions is not straightforward.
Participants may struggle to translate the everyday, implicit sense
of agency into an unusual, explicit judgement. An implicit way
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of measuring the sense of agency is by means of the intentional
binding paradigm: when an action is carried out in a voluntary
fashion and followed by an effect (typically a button press,
followed 250ms later by a tone), then the perceived timing of this
voluntary action and its effect move closer together (16). This
temporal compression is a commonly accepted implicit proxy of
the sense of agency. It could thus potentially replace the explicit
agency rating in a future study. All in all, it is possible, that in
the present study, the sense of agency measure was not sensitive
enough to highlight possible differences.
A further possible limitation is that all but four patients in the
present study, had an FMD affecting one or both their arms to
some degree. Alternative ways of responding, such as a foot pedal
or a voice switch could be used. Nevertheless, the study findings
are very unlikely to be attributed to direct interference by the
movement disorder as the responses in the FMD group did not
differ from those of healthy controls, and there was no difference
between the more and less symptomatic sides in the patients with
asymmetric symptoms.
Despite these possible limitations, the conclusion of this
study is that motor responses and the sense of agency are
normal in FMD, both with subliminal and supraliminal priming.
While normal subliminal priming was predicted, it is surprising
that motor responses, in terms of reaction speed and sense
of agency were normal with supraliminal priming. We had
originally predicted that supraliminal priming would impair
motor performance and sense of agency in the FMD group,
though not in the control group, because supraliminal priming
amounts to an explicit cue drawing attention to the impending
movement—precisely the conditions where FMDs are most
strongly manifested.
The most likely reason for these findings is that in FMD,
predictability of actions and outcomes, and hence conscious
motor experience, is key for abnormal movement to be
expressed. Crucially, our primes were always non-predictive.
Thus, any motor facilitation due to congruent vs. incongruent
priming must reflect an automatic increase in preparation
triggered by the congruent prime. Our results confirmed that
this automatic motor facilitation did indeed occur in the
FMD group, both for supraliminal and subliminal primes.
In contrast, previous studies focussed on predictive, high-
validity primes. Predictive primes allow a strategic, presumably
conscious, preparation for the forthcoming movement. Two
previous supraliminal priming studies showed faster reaction
times with high cue predictability [95% valid as opposed to non-
predictive (50%)] in healthy controls, but slower or unchanged
reaction times with high cue predictability in FMD (13, 14).
That is, whereas predictive supraliminal primes allow healthy
volunteers to prepare movements in advance, this process did
not operate as normal in FMD patients. Similarly, when a
joystick movement could be prepared (because the location it
needed to be moved to as quickly as possible once the go cue
appeared was known in advance), FMD patients’ movement
times became gradually slower across the block (13). Thus,
other studies have shown that patients with FMD differ from
healthy controls, with regards to reaction times or speed of
movement, when the supraliminal primes are highly predictable.
The same phenomenon might apply to the sense of agency
with supraliminal primes. In a future study, an additional
condition with a higher cue predictability (95% predictive) could
therefore usefully be introduced, and its effect on the sense of
agency analyzed.
Thus, the crucial factor that underpins priming effects in
FMD, both in terms of motor speed and sense of agency,
might be the predictive nature of the prime. A predictive prime
typically allows people to strategically prepare their response to
the expected imperative stimulus in advance. We suggest that
people are normally conscious of such strategic preparation. In
FMD patients, this conscious strategic preparation would be
maladaptive. In contrast, when primes are non-predictive, they
may still facilitate performance through an automatic route, even
though they do not allow people to form conscious expectations
about the imperative stimulus, or the forthcoming response.
Our result suggests that this second, automatic form of motor
facilitation functions normally in patients with FMD.
Neurophysiological and neuropsychological studies
distinguish two routes to voluntary action. One route, based
on the parietal-lateral premotor pathway, predominates in
the control of movement in response to sensory stimuli. A
second route, based on the prefrontal and medial frontal
cortices, predominates in the control of internally-generated,
or intentional actions (17, 18). We suggest that the automatic
motor facilitation by non-predictive primes, whether subliminal
or supraliminal, may be mediated by the first, lateral route. In
contrast, strategic motor facilitation, including that provided
by predictive primes, might be mediated by the second, medial
route. These must remain speculations in the context of the
present study, because we did not obtain neurophysiological
or neuroimaging data to identify the neural origins of the
actions we studied. However, our behavioral findings, together
with imaging studies of others (19–22), suggests that the
pathophysiology of FMD may involve either dysfunction of
this second, medial route, or its inappropriate recruitment.
Interestingly, our findings suggest that the lateral route to action
remains functional. Thus, therapeutic strategies for FMD might
usefully attempt to shift motor control from the medial to
the lateral route, and promote motor automaticity rather than
motor strategy.
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